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ABSTRACT 
Why are the intergovernmental organizations referred to as the “four pillars” of international 
economic governance designed the way they are? Although much of their institutional design – 
issues like voting, membership, mandate, and funding – can be traced back to the history of 
the organization and the circumstances in which states established it, the institutional setup of 
each organization should ideally correspond with the type of public good it seeks to provide. 
Formal organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) are treaty-based, requiring 
strict conditions for membership and a high degree of legal rules and enforcement. They were 
also established to carry out a specific function, such as balance of payment issues for the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Bodies such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
new player in the field of economic governance, are less formal, and are concerned with 
monitoring, advising, and coordination of regulatory efforts. In some cases the roles of these 
organizations have expanded into new areas, or they have had functions replaced by other 
international bodies, especially in the wake of events such as the 1997 and 2008 financial 
crises. This paper seeks to understand how the design of these institutions is influenced not 
only by the states that established them, but also by the overarching goals the organization 
seeks to achieve, and its place within the broader framework of global economic governance. 
 
The paper begins by comparing the institutional design of the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank 
and the FSB. It compares the organizations’ legal basis, membership, organs and decision-
making processes, as well as the methods by which they develop and enforce rules for the 
global economy. The paper examines how these very different institutional setups relate to the 
goals of each organization. How has the design and function of these organizations changed 
over time, and to what extent has this change been due to the changing role of the 
organization, especially in light of events such as the 1997 and 2008 financial crises? 
Particular emphasis is given to the level of formality with which these organizations operate – 
when does the organization require strict rules regarding funding, voting, and membership, 
and when are more informal processes more appropriate? Finally, the paper seeks to 
understand to what extent these organizations, despite their differences in terms of mandate, 
structure, and methods are able to work together effectively and develop policies that are 
mutually consistent. An understanding of these dynamics will be useful in further discussions 
about how these organizations might be designed and structured better in order to address the 
challenges facing the global economy.  
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GOVERNANCE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF 
THE FSB, IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO 
 
Jan Wouters 
Jed Odermatt 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
International organizations are often established, or undergo fundamental reform, in 
the wake of international or regional crises. Just as the establishment of Bretton 
Woods institutions followed the Second World War and the economic turmoil of the 
1930s, the global economic crisis that broke out in 2008 brought about the impetus 
for a major transformation of the system of global economic governance. The 
response to the crisis saw new machinery established, such as the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) and the renewed G20, as well as a commitment to reform of the 
established institutions,1 such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and 
World Bank (IBRD or Bank).2 Stressing the importance of the newly-established FSB 
in the global economic governance architecture, US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner 
at a press conference at the G20 Pittsburgh summit in September 2009 stated that 
“[a]fter the second world war, we came together and established the IMF, the World 
Bank, the GATT which became the WTO. But the Financial Stability Board is, in 
effect, a fourth pillar of that architecture.”3 
 
The present paper focuses on the question of why the key pillars of global economic 
governance are designed the way they are. It seeks to understand how the 
institutional design of these bodies relates to the type of global public good they seek 
to provide, with a particular focus on the issue of financial stability. The first section 
briefly discusses the four institutions and the types of global public goods they were 
established to provide. It shows how their role has changed over time in response to 
changes in the world economy and in global politics. The next section goes on to 
examine and compare certain features of their institutional design, focusing on issues 
such as the organization’s legal basis, membership, mandate, structure, formality and 
decision-making processes. These design features all represent deliberate choices 
made by the states that established them. To a certain extent these decisions reflect 
the political environment at the time of their creation, and the interests of the powerful 
states. Yet the design of the institutions also reflects the type of public goods they 
were established to provide, and that organization’s place within the wider multilateral 
fabric of global governance. The paper examines how these institutions relate to each 
other and interact, in order to understand whether or not they achieve a coherent 
framework for global economic governance. In concludes with a brief discussion 
about whether the FSB should be transformed to a ‘hard’ organization similar to the 
other three pillars, or whether it should remain an informal body. 
 
                                                     
1
 G20, Declaration on the Summit of Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington DC, November 14-15, 
2008, point 9: “We are committed to advancing the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so that they can more 
adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in order to increase their legitimacy and 
effectiveness.” 
2
 The term ‘World Bank’ usually refers to two institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) while ‘World Bank Group’ includes these bodies as well 
as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). In this paper ‘World Bank’ refers to the IBRD, which was 
established at Bretton Woods. 
3
 Press Briefing by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on the G20 Meetings, Pittsburgh Convention Centre, Pittsburgh, 
24 September 2009. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Briefing-by-Treasury-Secretary-Geithner-on-
the-G20-Meetings>. 
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2. THE ROLE OF THE “FOUR PILLARS” OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
 
International institutions are often established to allow states to more effectively deal 
with problems that cannot be addressed effectively at the domestic level. In this way 
they contribute to the provision of global public goods. There is some debate about 
what constitutes a ‘public good’, but it is generally recognized that they are both non-
excludable and non-rivalrous 4 , i.e. that they can be consumed without depriving 
another of that good. The protection of the environment is a classic example since 
acts undertaken to improve the air quality or combat climate change at the state level 
also benefit others. Public goods at the global level include the prevention of 
communicable diseases, the prevention of global armed conflict and use of nuclear 
weapons, or the protection of the cultural heritage of mankind. 
 
There is a good case for adding economic and financial stability to this list.5 If it was 
not already apparent, the global financial crisis of the past five years has reminded us 
how easily instability in one part of the global economy can be disastrous for other 
regions, and the international economy as a whole. The economic damage sustained 
from these crises also has a negative impact on the enjoyment of other global goods, 
for instance, by depriving resources that might be used for poverty alleviation or by 
making global cooperation in other fields, such as public health and the environment, 
more difficult. It is for this reason that financial stability has been considered as a 
global public good:  
 
Financial stability can be seen as an international public good because financial 
instability is a potential public bad that spreads across countries. But collective action 
problems have led so far to an under-provision of the international public good, with 
severe redistributive effects.
6
 
 
All countries have an interest in an economic and financial system that is more or less 
‘stable’, although there is disagreement about what ‘stability’ exactly entails.7 The lack 
of banking or other economic crises does not necessarily point to the stability of a 
financial system, and it has been notoriously difficult to identify possible causes of 
instability. While one might point to the collapse of one bank or financial system as a 
trigger, the precise sources of financial instability are increasingly difficult to pinpoint. 
Financial stability suffers from a similar collective action problem associated with 
other global public goods. While the whole international community has an interest in 
a ‘stable’ global financial system, individual states will continue to take steps that are 
in their own (short-term) interests, even if they remain dangerous for the system as a 
whole. It is for this reason that states have looked to international institutions to help 
overcome this collective action problem and promote greater global cooperation. 
 
Stability of the global economic system (rather than financial stability) was one of the 
key factors behind the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions. The IMF was 
primarily established with the vision of helping to ensure the stability of the 
                                                     
4
 J. E. Stiglitz, ‘Global Public Goods and Global Finance: Does Global Governance Ensure that the Global Public 
Interest is Served?’, in J.-P. Touffut (ed.) Advancing Public Goods (Edward Elgar, 2006) 149. P.A. Samuelson, ‘The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’ 36 (4) Review of Economics and Statistics (1954). pp. 387–389; M. Olson, The 
Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press, 1965); I. Kaul, I. 
Grunberg and M. Stern (eds.) Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (OUP, 1999). 
5
 “[I]nternational financial codes and standards, such as Basel III, are intended to foster the GPG [Global Public Good] 
of enhanced financial stability.” I. Kaul, ‘Global Public Goods: Explaining their Under provision’ 15 (3) Journal of 
International Economic Law (2012) 734. 
6
 C. Wyplosz,‘International Financial Stability’, in I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (eds.) Global Public Goods: 
International Cooperation in the 21st Century (OUP, 1999), 156. 
7
 “The term financial stability has gained prominence in international policy discussions and has become an actively 
discussed academic topic since the mid-1990s. However, a precise definition still eludes the work done so far.” U. 
Das, M. Quintyn and K. Chenard, ‘Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System Stability? An Empirical 
Analysis’ IMF Working Paper WP/04/89 (2004), 5. 
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international monetary system. The IMF contributes to macro-economic stability 
primarily by providing support and advice to countries facing external payment 
difficulties. The IMF is able to take action during times of crisis to help prevent 
international contagion and maintain a more stable economic system. The World 
Bank also plays a role by providing finance and advice to countries that reform their 
economies, including in the financial sector. Since the crisis that broke out in 2008, 
there has been a sharpened focus on the issue of financial stability and the topic of 
macroprudential regulation. This was not an explicit goal of the original Bretton 
Woods institutions and the IMF and World Bank do not have a specific mandate to 
deal with the regulation of international finance. This reflects the economic system of 
the 1940s, where trade in goods was increasingly globalized, but finance and 
financial services were not. 
 
Rather than creating an institution responsible for financial stability, various 
international organizations and other bodies took up the role. The Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), for example, works alongside the IMF and World 
Bank in the field of financial stability. The BIS houses the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), which works on issues of banking 
supervision. Bodies such as the International Organization of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO) deal with stock market regulation, and the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) deal with accounting practices. In contrast with the 
Bretton Woods institutions, global financial governance is composed of a diverse 
range of international actors. This problem of diversified and often overlapping entities 
was one of the issues that the Financial Stability Board was established to help 
overcome. Rather than create a new institution in the mould of the Bretton Woods 
system, the world’s major economies opted for a much more informal mechanism. 
Instead of establishing an organization to create and enforce binding rules, or 
endowing an existing body such as the IMF with greater responsibilities, they 
established an ‘umbrella’ body that would play a role of coordination and supervision 
of best practices and standards. 
 
While the FSB, IMF and World Bank all have mandates related to the stability of the 
global economy, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established with a more 
narrow aim, to help economies move towards further trade liberalization. Although the 
WTO may contribute indirectly to economic stability, it provides a very different 
‘service’ in the global economic architecture. Unlike the enjoyment of a stable 
economic system, free trade is itself not a public good. Trade liberalization can benefit 
the world economy, and greater economic interdependence through trade can limit 
the risk of global instability and armed conflict. Yet the benefits of trade liberalization 
are not felt equally, and its benefits can be excluded from others. While trade 
liberalization is not a ‘global public good’ in this sense, the WTO can be seen as 
providing a public good in itself, that is, by providing a mechanism by which its 
Members can agree upon binding rules and settle disputes. The WTO creates a 
forum where governments are capable of negotiating agreements to progressively 
open markets and also provides a rule-based mechanism for enforcing these 
agreements. In turn, the work of the WTO, by promoting further liberalization, 
contributes to the wider benefit of strengthening the international trade regime and 
promoting economic growth. By contributing to a rule-based system of international 
trade, the WTO, alongside the other institutions, also contributes to a more stable 
international system as a whole. While it does not have the specific mandate of 
promoting economic stability, the WTO’s work can be seen as closely linked with that 
of the other pillars. Indeed, the WTO is the modern equivalent of the International 
Trade Organization (ITO), the body intended to sit alongside the other Bretton Woods 
institutions, since it was understood that strengthening and promoting international 
trade would encourage economic growth and stability.  
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All of these bodies play a role, either directly or indirectly, in supporting the stability of 
the international economic system. Yet they also provide public goods that fall outside 
of their stated mandates. First, each of them contributes to a rule-based system for 
the global economy. They therefore contribute to the development of an international 
system in which commitments are more likely to be complied with. Each of these 
bodies have their own systems of ensuring compliance, relying on legal (WTO), 
financial (IMF) and peer review (FSB) methods to ensure actors behave according to 
the rules of the system. A more open and competitive international market can also 
be seen as a global public good,8 especially where it leads to greater economic 
development and poverty reduction. The organizations discussed here can also 
provide or support the enjoyment of other associated public goods. For instance, 
whereas the World Bank originally provided finance to its Member Countries to 
improve infrastructure, industry and agriculture, it is now strongly involved in 
improving rule of law, good governance, and promoting health, education and poverty 
alleviation in developing countries. Similarly, the WTO’s role has also shifted, as 
states have used the body to move from narrowly-defined trade issues, to areas such 
as intellectual property rights. These bodies, especially the IMF and World Bank, also 
provide an enormous amount of data and public information, for example the IMF’s 
data on balance of payments. 9  The gathering and publishing of these data also 
contributes to a ‘global good’ of greater information and transparency. Publication of 
reports and peer review of member jurisdictions contribute to a greater amount of 
information and knowledge about each other’s economic and financial positions. The 
considerable expertise developed by these bodies in various fields also further 
contributes to this public good.  
 
3. THE DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS  
 
The design of international institutions is influenced by the role that the body in 
question plays within the international system. As Koremenos et. al. argue, 
differences in institutional design do not occur by chance, but “are the result of 
rational, purposive interactions among states and other international actors to solve 
specific problems.”10 We seek to understand how the design of these bodies differs in 
several key aspects of their design including legal basis, mandate, membership, and 
formality and structure and how this design is influenced by the organization’s role in 
global economic governance. Although the design of these bodies naturally reflects 
the political interests of states at the time of the organization’s creation, they also 
reflect the type of global public good it seeks to provide, as well as the organization’s 
place within the broader international economic system. 
 
3.1 LEGAL BASIS AND MANDATE 
 
Legal Basis 
 
International institutions vary according to the types of instruments used to bring them 
to life. The FSB was created in April 2009 through a decision of the G20 leaders at 
their London summit.11 G20 leaders decided that there was a need “to establish the 
much greater consistency and systematic cooperation between countries, and the 
                                                     
8
 N. Birdsall and R. Z. Lawrence, ‘Deep Integration and Trade Agreements: Good for Developing Countries?’ in I. Kaul, 
I. Grunberg and M. Stern (eds.) Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (OUP, 1999), 133. 
9
 See B. Koremenos, C. Lipson, and D. Snidal, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’ 55(4) International 
Organization (2001) 771: “The least intrusive form of centralization is information collection, and many international 
institutions engage in it. Members of the IMF, for instance, need not gather their own data on others’ balance of 
payments. Instead the IMF regularly collects, evaluates, and publishes itemized statistics on its members’ payments.” 
10
 B. Koremenos, C. Lipson, and D. Snidal, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’ 55(4) International 
Organization (2001), 762. 
11
 Leaders Statement at the G20 Summit, London, 3 April 2009. 
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framework of internationally agreed high standards, that a global financial system 
requires.” 12  The FSB is the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 
established by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 1999 in the 
wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. It is the first institutional innovation of the renewed 
G2013, a body which itself is not grounded in any type of formal international treaty or 
other instrument. Unlike the other organizations discussed in this paper, the FSB 
does not have a formal international legal basis. Its founding Charter is a 
‘memorandum of understanding’, which unlike a treaty, does not impose international 
legal obligations upon its members.14 The G20 made the decision at the June 2012 
Los Cabos Summit to establish the FSB ‘on an enduring organisation footing’15, and 
to endow the FSB with legal personality. The FSB has now been established as an 
association under Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code. The FSB Plenary approved the 
FSB’s Articles of Association in January 2013,16 although the FSB Charter remains 
the document governing the FSB’s activities and decision-making. This innovation, as 
well as the establishment of a more defined framework for decision-making, has seen 
the FSB slowly transform from a loose and informal body into a more structured 
organization. However, the FSB has a long way to go before it becomes anything like 
the other pillars in terms of legal basis. The FSB Articles of Association are binding 
under Swiss law, but at the international level, the Charter remains a non-binding 
agreement between FSB members. Moreover, it is unclear how the FSB will further 
transform to become a more permanent and enduring body. 17  At the 2013 G20 
summit in Russia, G20 leaders requested the FSB to “review the structure of its 
representation”18 and the FSB will report on this at the 2014 Brisbane Summit.  
 
The FSB’s informal structure is in sharp contrast with the other pillars, all of which are 
established through international treaties, and enjoy international legal personality. 
The IMF is established by Articles of Agreement19 which were signed along with the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.20 The WTO is also a treaty-based organization, founded upon the 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement21, which builds upon GATT, a multilateral agreement regulating 
international trade in goods. These treaty-based bodies enjoy the rights of an 
international organization, such as legal personality, privileges and immunities, and 
they have negotiated headquarters agreements with states. For the time being the 
FSB is covered by the BIS Headquarters Agreement, although as the FSB becomes 
more institutionalized, a separate headquarters agreement with Switzerland may be 
appropriate in the future. 
 
The G20 leaders rejected the notion of establishing the FSB as a formal international 
organization based on a multilateral treaty, a move considered “not to be an 
appropriate legal form at this juncture.” 22  The FSB Charter can and has been 
continuously changed and adapted by the G20.  This is in contrast to a formal treaty, 
which, once drafted, is extremely difficult to amend.  
                                                     
12
 Leaders Statement at the G20 Summit, London, 3 April 2009.  
13
 E. Helleiner, ‘What Role for the New Financial Stability Board? The Politics of International Standards after the 
Crisis’ 1 (3) Global Policy (2010), 282. 
14
 International Monetary Fund, ‘IMF Membership in the Financial Stability Board’, Prepared by the Legal and 
Monetary and Capital Markets Departments, Approved by José Viñals and Sean Hagan, 10 August 2010. 
15
 Financial Stability Board, Report to the G20 Los Cabos Summit on Strengthening FSB Capacity, Resources and 
Governance, 18-19 June 2012. 
16
 Articles of Association of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 28 January 2013. 
17
 C. Brummer, ‘Charter of the Financial Stability Board: Introductory Note’ 51 International Legal Materials 4 (2012) 
828. 
18
 G20 Leaders Declaration, Saint Petersburg, Russia,  5-6 September 2013. 
19
 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 2 UNTS 39, as amended through June 28, 
1990. 
20
 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank For Reconstruction and Development, July-22, 1944.  
21
 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, signed on 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154. 
22
 Financial Stability Board, Report to the G20 Los Cabos Summit on Strengthening FSB Capacity, Resources and 
Governance, 18-19 June 2012. 
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Mandates 
 
The founding documents of these bodies set out the specific mandates and powers of 
the organization. The institutions now perform a range of tasks that were not foreseen 
at the time of their creation and their roles have changed and adapted over time. 
Nevertheless, the mandate of the bodies in the founding documents remains of 
paramount importance since it sets out the core role of the organization.  
 
Article 1 of the FSB Charter provides the Board’s objectives. It sets out a role of 
coordination of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies 
to promote and implement financial sector policies. The FSB is also tasked with 
collaborating with international financial institutions to address vulnerabilities of the 
international financial system. The Charter sets out the FSB mandate, which is to: 
 
(a) assess vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and identify and review 
on a timely and ongoing basis within a macroprudential perspective, the regulatory, 
supervisory and related actions needed to address them, and their outcomes; 
(b) promote coordination and information exchange among authorities responsible for 
financial stability; 
(c) monitor and advise on market developments and their implications for regulatory 
policy; 
(d) advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory standards; 
(e) undertake joint strategic reviews of and coordinate the policy development work of 
the international standard setting bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, 
focused on priorities and addressing gaps; 
(f) set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges; 
(g) support contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with 
respect to systemically important firms; 
(h) collaborate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to conduct Early Warning 
Exercises; 
(i) promote member jurisdictions’ implementation of agreed commitments, standards 
and policy recommendations through monitoring of implementation, peer review and 
disclosure; and 
(j) undertake any other tasks agreed by its Members in the course of its activities and 
within the framework of this Charter.
23
 
 
The FSB’s Charter remains very much ‘a work in progress’. It has been changed 
several times and G20 countries may continue to add new tasks to the list of FSB 
responsibilities. Unlike international organizations which are given a mandate in a 
specific and relatively narrow field, the FSB is much more geared towards being a 
manager and harmonizer of regulatory efforts at different levels. The Charter states 
that the FSB “should consult widely amongst its Members and with other stakeholders 
including private sector and non-member authorities” and “will promote and help 
coordinate the alignment of the activities of the SSBs [Standard Setting Bodies]”. 
Unlike the other international bodies discussed here, which have their own legal 
structures and powers to implement a specific mandate, the FSB is much more 
focused on coordination and oversight tasks and does not possess legal powers as 
such. It is therefore far from being on par with the other pillars.  
 
Article 1 of the IMF Articles of Agreement sets out the purposes for which the IMF 
was established. These include the promotion of international monetary cooperation, 
the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, exchange stability, and the 
establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions 
between members. The Fund’s purposes are set out in a very specific manner, and 
are an exhaustive, rather than an indicative list of the Fund’s aims. Moreover, they 
                                                     
23
 Charter of the Financial Stability Board, June 2012. Article (2), available at < 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf>.  
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state the purposes that should guide the IMF’s policies, rather than setting out its 
specific powers. The Articles of Agreement contain no lofty language like the 
preamble for some other organizations, and make no mention of more ‘political’ goals 
such as fostering democracy, rule of law etc. The absence of such goals reflects the 
requirement at the time of the IMF’s creation to have a great number of countries 
willing to join the organization. The very defined purposes given to the IMF can also 
be understood in the light of the IMF being a fund, a body that employs the resources 
of its members, and as such possesses considerable economic weight. By 
circumscribing the goals of the Fund to a set of defined purposes in the Articles of 
Agreement, there is arguably less chance of it being used for goals that deviate too 
far from its original mandate. 
 
In a similar way, the IBRD Articles of Agreement set out the purposes of the Bank, 
which are to be used to ‘guide’ its decisions. The Bank’s first purpose is directly 
related to its goal of contributing to the economic restoration in the post-War period. 
The Bank’s role in the immediate post-War years was “to assist in bringing about a 
smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy.” Article 1(a) states that its 
goal is 
 
(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by 
facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration 
of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities 
to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities 
and resources in less developed countries. 
 
The Bank’s goals did not end at post-war reconstruction, however. More generally, 
the Bank should also “promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or 
participations in loans and other investments made by private investors” and “promote 
the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of 
equilibrium in balances of payments”. Like the IMF, the IBRD’s objectives are 
delimited to ensure that the Bank is not used for other purposes. Indeed the Articles 
of Agreement explicitly prohibit the Bank from granting loans based on “political or 
other non-economic influences or considerations.”24 Today, the mandate of the Bank 
is geared more towards the goal of promoting poverty reduction through the supply of 
technical and financial support. The IBRD has, just like other international 
organizations, progressively expanded from its original mandate to cover new areas 
and issues. While this should be viewed as a natural evolution for the organization, it 
has at times been criticized for its ‘mission creep’ by expanding towards areas such 
as biodiversity or corruption.25 Moreover, its role has expanded from being that of a 
traditional lender to being more involved in global policy-making, and has a 
considerable body of expertise in a wide range of policy fields. 
 
Article II of the WTO Agreement sets out the aims of the organization in a very broad 
manner: the WTO “shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct 
of trade relations among its Members”.26 Some of the WTO’s aims are mentioned in 
Article III setting out the functions of the organization. It shall inter alia “provide the 
forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations 
in matters dealt with under the agreements” and shall administer the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU). These goals and straightforward and rather 
technical. There is little mention, save for brief references in the preamble, to 
‘overarching goals’. This reflects the member-driven nature of the WTO. It is 
established primarily as a tool for its Members, rather than a body with its own 
mandate and autonomous powers. As an illustration, while the website of the IBRD is 
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emblazoned with the slogan ‘Working for a World Free of Poverty’, and the IMF states 
that it is ‘working together to foster global growth and economic prosperity’ the WTO 
describes its mandate to the world in much drier terms: the “WTO is a rules-based, 
member-driven organization — all decisions are made by the member governments, 
and the rules are the outcome of negotiations among members.”27 
 
3.2 MEMBERSHIP AND VOTING 
 
While international organizations may develop a certain level of autonomy, they are 
influenced by their members, primarily states. The rules governing who can become a 
member and under what conditions, are important in shaping the organization. 
Membership can be broad-based and universal, such as the UN, or may establish 
strict criteria for membership and accession, such as the EU. Older international 
institutions generally only allow membership for states, while some newer 
organizations tend to allow membership of other international organizations and even 
some non-state actors, albeit with often differing levels of participation. This reflects 
the fact that states are no longer the only significant actors in international relations, 
especially in global economic governance. Rules on participation and voting are also 
a critical issue in many organizations. While the ‘one state, one vote’ rule applies to 
many international organizations, typically representing the principle of the sovereign 
equality of states, a number of organizations in the field of economic governance 
have developed weighted voting to account for the economic size and power of their 
members. Other bodies may put more emphasis on consensus, meaning that formal 
voting procedures are in practice not as critical to the organization.  
 
When the FSB was established in 2009, it significantly expanded its membership from 
the members of the original FSF to include a much greater number and range of 
economic players. The limited membership of the FSF was seen to be one of its main 
drawbacks, as it represented a very limited group of actors (mainly representing 
Western economies) which could be seen as dictating policies to rest of the world.28 
Membership of the FSB was expanded to include, in addition to the existing members 
of the FSF, all the members of the G20. This added emerging economies such as 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa and Turkey. Membership was also expanded to include the European 
Commission (the European Central Bank (ECB) was already an FSF member) and 
Spain (which is regularly invited to G20 meetings).29 This broadened membership still 
leaves it with far fewer members than the World Bank/IMF (188 members) and the 
WTO (159 members). 
 
What is most striking about the membership of the FSB is the diversity of bodies 
represented, which includes a range of influential non-state actors. The FSB includes 
three types of members. The first type of membership is the ‘member jurisdictions’. 
The reference to ‘jurisdictions’ and not ‘states’ allows the participation of bodies such 
as the ECB and European Commission in this list. Moreover, it is not strictly the states 
that are represented, but the relevant authorities responsible for financial stability in 
that jurisdiction. For instance, the United States is represented through three 
members, the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The second 
category of member is the International Financial Institutions: the BIS, IMF, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the IBRD. 
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One of the key organizations discussed in this paper, the WTO, is conspicuously 
absent from this list. Although the WTO does not have an explicit role in financial 
regulation, it nevertheless plays a role in the liberalization of financial services within 
the framework of GATS and could also have been included as a body with which the 
FSB coordinates. This may be important in cases where WTO rules potentially 
impede the ability of FSB members to implement financial regulation. The third type of 
member is International Standard-Setting, Regulatory, Supervisory and Central Bank 
Bodies. These currently include the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), IOSCO, the Basel Committee, Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS), Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) and 
the IASB. The types of bodies represented within the FSB is indeed diverse, ranging 
from state authorities such as the central banks and regulatory agencies, to 
international organizations such as the IMF, to purely private standard-setting bodies 
such as IASB. The FSB’s membership can be seen as reflecting the body’s objective, 
which is not establishing binding and enforceable legal rules for its members, but co-
ordination at different levels. In order to promote this public good, the FSB is 
composed of those bodies that have the greatest role in formation of regulatory, 
supervisory and other financial sector policies. Moreover, the FSB’s membership 
includes only the more advanced economies, reflecting the fact that these are the 
jurisdictions that have the largest influence in, and are also most affected by, 
regulatory and financial sector policies. 
 
Although the FSB Charter sets out these three types of members, the list is not 
exhaustive, and new members could be included over time. Article 5(2) of the Charter 
states that “[t]he eligibility of Members will be reviewed periodically by the Plenary in 
the light of the FSB objectives”, implying that members may also be excluded or 
removed from the FSB. Membership could be expanded further to include a greater 
number of member jurisdictions, for example, other international organizations or 
other bodies. Although the world’s major economies (represented as G20 members) 
are included, a greater number of non-Western states could also be included, a step 
that would arguably strengthen the legitimacy of the FSB. Yet a long list of members 
would also entail problems. Being composed of a limited number of major economic 
actors may make the decision-making process more manageable than an 
organization with wide membership and formal voting procedures. That being said, 
one of the criticisms of the FSB’s predecessor, the FSF, was that it represented too 
narrow a range of actors. The FSB’s membership may have to expand at some point. 
However, since there are no strict membership criteria or guidelines on who should 
be a member, the proper composition of the FSB will remain a subject of debate. 
 
Although there is little public information about the FSB’s decision-making process, 
the FSB generally operates via consensus. Although each member has one vote, in 
practice there is a system of ‘weighted voting’. This is because more economically 
important jurisdictions such as the US, China and Russia are represented by the 
central bank, finance ministry and securities regulators, whereas smaller jurisdictions 
are represented by only one or two of these. The number of seats assigned to each 
jurisdiction depends on the size of its economy, the activity of the financial market and 
national financial stability arrangements.30 Moreover, these economically important 
countries are also represented via the international institutions with FSB membership, 
such as the IMF and IBRD. In practice, this gives the governments of economically 
important countries even greater representation in the organization. This structure 
has also been criticized as making the FSB an overly political, rather than technical, 
body, one which may be unwilling to tell the ‘hard truths’ needed to ensure financial 
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stability.31 Gadinis, noting that around a quarter of the FSB Plenary is represented by 
state finance ministers or treasury secretaries, argues that “it is the presence of the 
politicians that distinguishes the FSB from the other international bodies in financial 
regulation”32 such as the Basel Committee or IOSCO. The requirement of consensus 
decision-making has also been criticized since in practice it gives everyone a veto 
over the decision-making process, making it difficult to expel or discipline a member.33 
As discussed below, in organizations like the WTO, consensus decision-making may 
be appropriate. However, it has been argued that “in the case of the FSB, if it is to 
perform its countercyclical role properly, it will be very difficult to avoid politically 
unpopular messages.”34  
 
The conditions of membership of the IMF are outlined in Article II of the Fund’s 
Articles of Agreement. Membership is only open to ‘countries’ and therefore excludes 
other international or regional organizations such as the EU. The IMF is very much a 
traditional international organization in this sense. Yet unlike many traditional 
organizations where participation is equal and voting remains on a ‘one state, one 
vote’ basis, IMF decision-making is based on a somewhat complex system of 
quotas.35 Quotas are used to determine both the member’s voting power36 and the 
level of IMF financing available to a member.37 Since decisions are made based on 
the quotas, the United States and European countries have historically had a greater 
role in the organization. Such weighting of votes was intended to reflect the strength 
of each member within the global economy. However, it is generally agreed that the 
current system no longer adequately reflects the economic balance of power, 
especially since it under-represents the world’s emerging economic powers. There 
has been considerable debate about how quotas are calculated, and whether the 
complex formula to allocate quotas has benefited larger and more developed 
economies. The reform of the IMF quotas has therefore been a field in which there 
has been continuous reform, and G20 leaders have decided to continue a transfer of 
votes to emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India and Russia.38 Moreover, as 
discussed above, the role of the IMF has shifted since it was originally created, and 
now has a greater role in advising and financing developing countries.  
 
The quota system can be partly explained by historical reasons. A ‘one state, one 
vote’ system would not have been a politically acceptable option at the time of its 
creation, since the Fund was resourced by the world’s powerful economies, such as 
the United States, who wanted to ensure a greater say in the management of the 
Fund. Yet another reason for having a different voting structure from other 
organizations is due to the IMF’s role as a fund, rather than a rule-making body. The 
allocation of quotas reflects the size of the member in the world economy and also 
determines its contribution to the IMF. The contribution of these major economies is 
crucial for the IMF to be able to fulfill its role. Although there is serious discussion 
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regarding how the quotas are to be allocated, there is little disagreement that voting 
weight in the IMF should broadly reflect the member’s relative weight in the world 
economy. When making a decision to allow a bailout of a country, for example, the 
effect on IMF member countries will differ, since each country has contributed 
different levels. Since the IMF deals with the allocation of large, finite resources, a 
‘one state, one vote’ system would not reflect each member country’s stake in the 
decision-making. In cases where an 85% majority is required39, the United States 
possesses a de facto veto right. Even in cases where decisions are made by 
consensus or not put to a vote, greater voting rights can translate into greater 
bargaining power, as major decisions require the agreement of the major economic 
powers. 
 
The IBRD Articles of Agreement set out the conditions for membership, which is 
limited to states that are also member countries of the IMF. Like the IMF, the Bank 
also employs a system of weighted voting.40 The weighted voting systems of the IMF 
and the World Bank are somewhat unique in international organizations, and reflect in 
many ways the political situation at the time of their creation. Indeed most other 
international organizations do not use a system of weighted voting, despite the fact 
that the benefits members derive from the organization and the resources members 
provide to them, often differ dramatically. Despite criticisms of the weighted voting 
systems of the IMF and IBRD, these two organizations have continued to be effective 
since their creation in the 1940s. It has even been argued that a weighted system of 
voting can increase the effectiveness of the organization and compliance with its 
decisions, since “[c]ountries often treat decisions of equal voting organizations as 
advisory opinions, but abide by decisions of weighted voting organizations.”41  
 
The conditions for membership in the IMF and IBRD are quite open, allowing these 
bodies to achieve almost universal membership. The WTO has more restrictive rules 
for accession and membership, and entrance can often be more of a political rather 
than legal issue. Article XI of the WTO Agreement sets out the original membership of 
the WTO, which includes all contracting parties to GATT 1947, as well as the 
European Communities (now European Union). Article XII applies to accession to the 
WTO, a far more political and legally complex process than accession in the other 
bodies. Accession is open not only to ‘states’ but also to ‘customs territories’ wherever 
they have “full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations.42 This 
has allowed membership of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan alongside that of the 
People’s Republic of China. In addition to the full WTO members, there are also 
observer governments, and a long list of observer organizations, including the IMF 
and World Bank. Decisions on accession, however, are taken by the Ministerial 
Conference.43 
 
While the IMF and World Bank both have a complex formula for voting, the WTO uses 
‘one member, one vote’ approach which applies in most traditional international 
organizations. However, the practice of the WTO is to take decisions by consensus.44 
The de facto requirement for consensus may seem to be a factor that would 
complicate decision-making, since it allows any member to exercise a form of veto. 
However the requirement for consensus can also enhance effectiveness. In the field 
of trade liberalization, it is not only important that there is a high number of 
participants in an agreement, but also that they will abide by the agreed-upon rules. 
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Ehlermann and Ehring argue that an advantage of consensus is “the fact that no 
decisions are likely to be taken against the opposition of the big and mighty, who 
generally need to implement the decision for it to have practical value.”45 Consensus 
should not be confused with the requirement of unanimity. Consensus is reached 
when no member raises a formal objection to the proposal being discussed. Taking 
decisions by consensus means that a member is not out-voted, arguably decreasing 
the likelihood that a member will not abide by any decision. However, as the WTO 
expands, both in terms of membership and types of issues it covers, the requirement 
for consensus has the potential to grind decision-making to a standstill. Although 
there is currently little interest in changing the voting arrangements at the WTO (as 
there is in the IMF), some have suggested a form of weighted voting may also be 
suitable for the WTO.46  A requirement of a simple majority, as often required in 
international organizations, would also be inappropriate in the WTO. Due to their 
levels of economic development and participation in world trade, members have 
differing levels of interest in developing rules on world trade. However, unlike the 
World Bank and IMF, the WTO is not involved in the allocation of funds and 
resources, arguably lessening the need for weighted voting. Rather than imposing 
binding decisions on its members, the preference in the WTO has been towards 
working through consensus and (often long) negotiations. 
 
3.3 STRUCTURE AND FORMALITY 
 
International organizations also differ in their structure and level of formality. While the 
Bretton Woods institutions are categorized by a high level of formality and have a 
highly defined institutional structure, many modern forms of intergovernmental 
cooperation such as the G20, and bodies such as the FSB, remain markedly informal. 
While informal meetings of heads of states have existed in the past, what sets the 
G20 and FSB apart is the amount and variety of serious tasks states have been 
assigned to these bodies. Informal arrangements can be highly useful, allowing these 
bodies to quickly adapt to new developments and to reach consensus on a number of 
issues. This is especially the case at times such as those following the 2008 global 
economic crisis, where urgent action was needed at the international level, and the 
G20 was chosen as the appropriate forum to deal with these issues. It has been 
argued that in the field of financial stability, rigid rules and decision-making process 
are not appropriate: “Traditional international law, which usually involves very lengthy 
formal negotiating processes that then lock in commitments at a particular point in 
time, is not well suited to a world in which problems, interests, and the relevant actors 
are not clearly defined and are changing rapidly.”47 Yet the lack of clear rules for their 
operation may also weaken the international legitimacy of informal bodies. Moreover, 
once the crisis giving impetus for a quick response has subsided, the body can grow 
stagnant without a strong state or group of states to push along the agenda. While 
informality may allow states to come to agreement more easily, it may also make the 
arrangements reached more ‘disposable’ when it is politically convenient. The FSB 
does not possess the capacity to take decisions with binding legal force, and 
therefore relies on other mechanisms, such as peer review and supervision, to ensure 
compliance. 
 
Greater formality and legal structure can make the organization less disposable. The 
Bretton Woods institutions have remained remarkably enduring, despite significant 
changes in the world economy since their creation. Less formal forms of cooperation 
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have remained far less enduring. In the wake of the next economic crisis, world 
leaders may simply leave aside or ignore the G20 and FSB for new forms of 
cooperation in the same way they did the G7 and Financial Stability Forum. There 
may also be competing forms of multilateralism which may seek to play a role in 
economic governance in the future, especially those stemming from the emerging 
economies, such as the BRICS. It is unlikely that the IMF or WTO could be replaced 
or pushed aside so easily. Rather than being an impediment to their work, these 
organizations’ formality and international legal status helps cement them as real 
pillars of the system of economic governance, and reflects the crucial importance of 
the public good they provide in the international system. 
 
Compared with the other bodies discussed here, the FSB is striking in terms of its 
fluid structure and low level of formality. Nevertheless, steps have been taken to 
progressively establish the FSB on a more ‘enduring organizational footing’.48 The 
FSB Charter sets out the structure of the organization and the mandate of the 
different bodies. The FSB consists of the Plenary; the Steering Committee; Standing 
Committees; Working Groups; the Regional Consultative Groups; the Chair; and the 
Secretariat. The Plenary is the sole decision-making body for all matters governed by 
the FSB Charter, including the FSB budget and work programme and the 
appointment of the FSB Chair. Decisions by the Plenary are taken by consensus. The 
Steering Committee provides operational guidance between FSB meetings and is 
responsible for monitoring and guiding the progress of FSB’s work. The composition 
of the Steering Committee is decided by the Plenary, taking into account geographic 
regions and institutional functions. 49  The FSB also includes various standing 
committees: Assessment of Vulnerabilities (SCAV), Supervisory and Regulatory 
Cooperation (SCSRC), Standards Implementation (SCSI), and Budget and 
Resources (SCBR). The tasks of these committees is to primarily monitor and advise, 
assist in co-ordination, set guidelines and best-practices, and to undertake peer 
review among members. Standing Committees may also establish working groups as 
needed, which may include representatives of non-FSB members. 50  There are 
‘Regional Consultative Groups’ (RGCs) for the Americas, Asia, Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Europe, Middle East and North Africa and for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. These groups allow the input and interaction with non-members regarding 
issues such as vulnerabilities in the financial system and methods of promoting 
greater financial stability. 51  They are one of the methods by which the FSB 
implements its goal to “consult widely amongst its Members and with other 
stakeholders including private sector and non-member authorities”52  and the goal 
endorsed at the G-20 Toronto Summit “to expand upon and formalize its outreach 
activities beyond the membership of the G-20 to reflect the global nature of our 
financial system”.53 By giving a greater say to non-members, RCGs go some way to 
make up for the fact that the FSB has only limited membership, representing only the 
most advanced world economies. The FSB Chair, selected from representatives from 
the Plenary, chairs meetings of the Plenary and of the Steering Committee, oversees 
the Secretariat, and represents the FSB externally. The Secretariat provides support 
to the FSB and its various groups, facilitates co-operation and communication among 
members, and manages manage the financial, material and human resources of the 
FSB.  
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The FSB’s Charter does not have the characteristic of being a legally-binding 
international instrument, such as the treaties founding other international 
organizations. The Charter itself states “[t]his Charter is not intended to create any 
legal rights or obligations.”54 The FSB is still formally tied to the G20, which itself 
remains only a very loose form of international co-operation, and remains without a 
secretariat or other permanent institutional organ. Helleiner argues that this means 
that “the FSB’s fate is tied up with that of the new G20 leaders’ forum”55 in much the 
same way that the FSF was tied to the G7. There have therefore been calls for the 
FSB to more towards a harder structure, such as being incorporated into the structure 
of an existing formal institution such as the IMF. This may help increase the 
legitimacy of the FSB, which at present only represents a narrow range of actors. It 
would provide the FSB with access to a permanent staff and secretariat of an 
established international organization. The FSB could also benefit from greater 
enforcement mechanisms, something which it currently lacks. Another option would 
be to slowly develop more formal arrangements for the FSB. Although it is very 
unlikely that this would come in the form of an international treaty, the G20 has taken 
steps to gradually give the FSB more formal autonomy. On 28 January 2013, the FSB 
was formally established as an association under Swiss law.56 This step implements 
the recommendations endorsed by G20 leaders at the 2012 Los Cabos Summit “for 
placing the FSB on an enduring organizational footing, with legal personality, 
strengthened governance, greater financial autonomy and enhanced capacity to 
coordinate the development and implementation of financial regulatory policies, while 
maintaining strong links with the BIS.”57 The FSB is still hosted by the BIS in Basel, 
Switzerland, and the two bodies have entered into an agreement that formalizes 
provision of services to the FSB Secretariat. The FSB could also move towards 
having its own permanent secretariat and staff, and establishing formal voting 
procedures, including for electing its Chair. If the FSB were to be transformed into a 
more classical international organization, it may also have seek to negotiate a 
separate Headquarters Agreement with the host state regarding privileges and 
immunities. It may also require greater accountability mechanisms than those that 
currently exist. FSB members may fear that giving greater autonomy to the FSB 
would risk the body moving away from its core role of coordination and oversight into 
more ‘regulatory’ role. In the field of financial regulation, there is definitely no desire at 
present to move towards a body operating in a fashion similar to the other pillars 
discussed here. 
 
While the FSB might be criticized for its informality, this could also be one of its 
strengths. The lack of formal decision-making and voting procedures may make it 
easier to come to agreement on certain issues. Moreover, its informal nature reflects 
the type of public good it seeks to provide, that of financial stability. Financial 
regulation is not a field which necessarily lends itself to centralized, international 
regulation. Member authorities and central banks still play the main role in ensuring 
financial stability, and states do not wish to give these powers to a centralized 
international body. Rather, they have sought to attain greater financial stability 
through monitoring and oversight mechanisms, and through establishing ‘best 
practices’ and guidelines rather than strictly enforceable legal measures. This looser 
form of oversight and standard-setting may be more appropriate to this area of 
economic activity. While principles on, for example, world trade, may be globalized, 
financial regulation tends to differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The goal is not 
‘harmonization’ or even ‘standardization’ of financial rules. The FSB report to the G20 
at the Los Cabos summit identified the ‘flexibility’ of the FSB as one of its strengths, 
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stating that “[t]he FSB should remain a flexible, responsive, member-driven, multi-
institutional and multidisciplinary institution.”58 It also states that it “considers a treaty-
based inter-governmental organisation not to be an appropriate legal form at this 
juncture.”59 This view may not only reflect the field of governance in which the FSB 
works, but may also reflect a trend more general away from formal legal institutions 
and centralized decision-making bodies towards more flexible forms of co-operation.  
 
One of the FSB’s key challenges relates to its  powers of enforcement. At first sight, 
the FSB’s ability to compel members is slight, as it does not have either the economic 
power of a body such as the IMF and World Bank, nor the legal enforcement 
mechanisms available in the WTO system, to compel members to abide by its 
commitments. Moreover, the FSB is not based on the implementation and 
enforcement of binding legal commitments under international law. Yet one should 
not underestimate this body’s power to ensure compliance in other ways. The FSB, 
tied to the G20, remains a form of ‘club’ governance and it relies more on monitoring 
and peer review rather than strict rule creation and enforcement. Some member 
jurisdictions, especially the less powerful, may comply with rules because they feel 
that their position at the table might be threatened if they do not implement 
commitments. More powerful members such as the US have the incentive to comply, 
since their refusal to implement recommendations would have the effect of 
undermining the system, especially when they were influential in developing those 
rules.60 While this may enhance compliance in the short term, the lack of hard law 
commitments and enforcement may be a weakness of the FSB in the longer term. 
Some members may decide it is no longer in their interest to move forward with 
implementing reforms. Without the impetus of the financial crisis to motivate FSB 
members into compliance, there is little else it can do. Moreover, as the FSB remains 
a club of limited membership, its ability (and legitimacy) to establish standards with a 
truly global reach may also diminish. It is likely that for the time being, however, the 
FSB will remain an entirely member-driven form of cooperation. As discussed below, 
the FSB still relies on other international bodies, such as the IMF, to fulfill its tasks. 
Importantly, it also relies on the BIS for its operational funding. While FSB members 
do not currently pay a membership fee, direct funding from its members could be 
possible in the future, which would give the FSB greater resources and financial 
autonomy to pursue its goals.61 
 
While the FSB constitutes a relatively new body, the IMF and World Bank are now 
among the oldest international economic organizations. While they remain very much 
member-driven organizations, many of the tasks undertaken require a level of 
autonomy by the organizations. Some have developed significant expertise in a range 
of different fields. In the IMF and World Bank, the staff and management play a far 
greater role than in the WTO, which acts primarily at the request of its members. Both 
Bretton Woods institutions work directly with governments, and rely heavily on the 
expertise and guidance of their staff, as overseen by the Executive Board. While the 
IMF is run by the Board of Governors, represented by each IMF member country, the 
task of running the IMF has been delegated in large part to the Executive Board, 
comprising 24 Executive Directors. Similarly, at the World Bank, the Board of 
Governors has delegated many duties to the Executive Directors, who meet at least 
twice a week and make decisions on the Bank’s lending activities. In both institutions, 
the Executive Directors are employees of the organization, and must act in its 
                                                     
58
 FSB, Report to the G20 Los Cabos Summit on Strengthening FSB Capacity, Resources and Governance 18-19 
June 2012. < http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120619c.pdf>, point 1.  
59
 FSB, supra note 58, point 11. 
60
 See J. Wouters, S. Van Kerckhoven and J. Odermatt, ‘The EU at the G20 and the G20's Impact on the EU’ in B. 
Van Vooren, S. Blockmans, and J. Wouters, The EU's Role in Global Governance : The Legal Dimension (2013) 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 259-270. 
61
 FSB, supra note 58, point 14. 
16 
 
interest, rather than representing their country of origin. In other words, the IMF and 
World Bank are fundamentally less ‘member-driven’ than the WTO, which still relies 
on individual governments to negotiate trade agreements and to bring disputes 
against each other. While the WTO Secretariat provides important technical support, 
the thrust of the WTO’s work is carried out through the membership. Rather than have 
a centralized monitoring and enforcement mechanism, enforcement of WTO rules 
relies on members bringing trade disputes before the settlement machinery. This de-
centralised system has worked at least until now – as a fairly effective procedure to 
not only resolve trade disputes, but to also progressively develop a body of 
international trade law on which members can rely. 
 
The WTO system of hard commitments, backed up by binding dispute settlement 
procedures, has been looked at as a potential design for other international bodies. 
Eichengreen suggested that a ‘World Financial Organization’ based on the WTO 
model might be an appropriate way forward for financial regulation, a field of 
governance still lacking binding international rules and effective enforcement 
mechanisms. In such an organization, international financial standards agreed upon 
members would be enforced by ‘independent panels of experts to determine whether 
countries were in compliance with those obligations.’62 Yet is questionable whether 
the WTO design would be workable in economic fields outside of trade, let alone 
financial regulation. States are generally reluctant to bring legal claims against other 
states, and it is unlikely that a state would file a claim against another for having not 
implemented sufficient financial regulation. An organization responsible for creating 
rules of global financial regulation would probably require a much more centralized 
system of enforcement, something that states would be very unlikely to agree upon. 
 
The four organizations discussed in this paper differ substantially in the ways in which 
they carry out their mandate and run their day to day activities. The FSB, for instance, 
relies entirely upon staff temporarily seconded to it from member organizations63 and 
member jurisdictions (such as economists from Central Banks)64. This is primarily due 
to the fact that it has a role of coordinating the work of other actors and bodies. The 
IMF on the other hand has a very large staff numbering some 2,475 people65, and its 
management plays a strong role in its day-to-day activities. Similarly, the World Bank 
relies on a large staff numbering around 9,000.66 This is primarily due to the need for 
experts to work with governments in negotiating and implementing loans. While the 
WTO is an important organization in international economic governance, its 
secretariat remains relatively small, comprising only 629 staff based in offices in 
Geneva.67 This reflects in many ways the role of the WTO as a body that facilitates 
action of its members. The Secretariat staff mainly provides technical and 
professional support to the committees, and legal assistance in the dispute settlement 
process. 
 
While states have established international organizations to tackle a range of 
international issues, they are also faced to a certain extent with what has been 
referred to as the ‘Frankenstein problem’, whereby the members lose control of the 
organization as it becomes more autonomous over time. States have used different 
methods to prevent this from happening. For instance, the WTO has remained highly-
member driven and makes most decisions through consensus (except for the 
‘inverted consensus’ in the case of the Dispute Settlement Body). It is not given a 
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broad mandate to pursue lofty goals that could be expansively interpreted, or 
endowed with a large staff and secretariat with central decision-making power. 
Moreover, the WTO remains overtly a mechanism to be used by members, rather 
than an autonomous institution. The panels and Appellate Body are also explicitly 
precluded from “adding or diminishing” in their interpretation of the WTO texts under 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 68  As Guzman describes it: “The WTO is 
simply not given the power to become a monster.”69 The IMF and World Bank have 
been able to adapt and change over time. Their mission has developed substantially 
from one of post-war construction and economic stability, and these bodies have 
become highly influential in member jurisdictions through the practice of 
conditionality. The IMF has also played a role in international standard-setting, in 
areas such as transparency and data dissemination.70 In contrast, there is very little 
chance that the FSB in its current form will stray from its mandate as it is tightly 
controlled by and bound to its membership. If it is to change its focus or expand its 
powers, this will likely be through a deliberate choice of the G20 leaders. 
 
4. WORKING TOGETHER? DEVELOPING MUTUALLY CONSISTENT POLICIES  
 
The comparison of the four organizations acting as the ‘four pillars’ of economic 
governance might give the impression that they stand apart, even isolated, from each 
other, and that there is a type of ‘division of powers’ and responsibilities in global 
economic governance. However, as discussed above, the goals of the bodies have 
tended to overlap and converge over time. These organizations continue to develop 
working relationships, cooperating in fields to maximize the coherence and 
effectiveness of economic governance. This section briefly examines some of the 
ways in which they have established relationships in practice. 
 
As discussed above, the FSB is the newcomer in the field of global economic 
governance. When it was given life in 2009 by the London G20 summit, it entered a 
system that included both older institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, but also 
an array of newer bodies that are not necessarily classical intergovernmental 
organizations, such as IASB and IOSCO. A decision had to be made about how the 
FSB would relate to those of these existing bodies, and where it would fit among 
established institutions such as the IMF. For example, the IMF, along with the World 
Bank and regional development banks, already plays a role in promoting and 
adopting sound principles and practices in the field of international financial 
regulation.71  
 
The IMF is one of the international financial institutions which are full members of the 
FSB. The IMF’s Articles of Agreement also specifically state that the Fund should 
cooperate with other organizations.72 The Article in question does not specify which 
bodies the Fund is to cooperate with, and at the time of the IMF’s creation, bodies 
such as the WTO and the FSB had not yet come into existence. Like the IMF, the 
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IBRD Articles of Agreement also state that the Bank should cooperate with other 
international organizations.73  
 
On 15 March 2013 the IMF Executive Board approved the IMF’s acceptance of 
membership in the FSB. The co-operation between the IMF/FSB and the division of 
responsibilities is set out in a joint letter between the IMF Managing Director and the 
Chairman of the FSF, the FSB’s predecessor, which continues to govern the 
relationship between the two bodies. The FSB Charter specifically refers to the role of 
the IMF in its work, for instance, stating that the FSB will “collaborate with the IMF to 
conduct Early Warning Exercises.”74 The Early Warning Exercises (EWE) have been 
jointly developed by the IMF and FSB and are intended to improve the analysis of 
systemic risks. In doing so, there is a division of responsibilities; the IMF generally is 
responsible for economic, macro-financial, and sovereign risk analysis whereas the 
FSB has greater responsibility for work on regulatory and supervisory issues.75 In 
addition, one of the conditions of FSB membership is to “agree to undergo periodic 
peer reviews, using among other evidence IMF/World Bank public Financial Sector 
Assessment Program reports.” 76  FSB members’ adherence to standards is also 
monitored by their publication of detailed assessments prepared by the IMF and 
World Bank as a basis for the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs). The IMF’s surveillance activities and the FSB’s review role often overlap, 
and the two bodies have identified areas where they could be complementary.77 The 
IMF and FSB have worked together in filling information gaps and strengthening data 
collection. The data gaps exposed by the 2008 crisis, as well as the need for future 
policy to be based on accurate and timely data, led the G20 to call upon the FSB/IMF 
to explore and make recommendations on the issue.78 The G20 may call upon the 
IMF, FSB and other bodies to cooperate and provide reports in other fields important 
to the G20, such as the joint IMF/BIS/FSB Report providing guidance to national 
authorities to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and 
instruments.79  
 
Close co-operation between these bodies also creates risks of duplication of tasks 
and overlapping responsibilities. The two bodies have sought to work together to 
establish consistent and mutually complementary policies by creating closer 
coordination both at the level of FSB and IMF staff, as well as between the IMF 
Executive Directors and members of the FSB Plenary.80 Generally, the work is based 
upon a division of responsibilities where the IMF is concerned with issues relating to 
macro-financial stability. Another source of tension may arise from the differing 
membership and mandates of the two bodies. The IMF is primarily bound by its own 
Articles of Agreement and is accountable to its members. As a separate international 
organization, the IMF should not support policies within the FSB that are not 
supported by its own membership (which includes large number of non-FSB 
countries) or that go against the IMF’s mandate.  
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While the FSB cooperates with the IMF/World Bank, the relationship between the 
FSB and the WTO is less defined. The WTO is not a member of the FSB, and there is 
yet no form of agreement or cooperation between the two bodies. However, as global 
efforts to bolster financial regulation increase, especially since the global financial 
crisis, issues may arise regarding how these efforts relate to existing commitments 
made by WTO members under GATS in the field of financial services. Efforts to put in 
place greater regulation of the financial sector could potentially be in breach of 
agreements on trade in financial services. In a meeting of 1 October 2012, the WTO 
Committee on Trade in Financial Services discussed how macroprudential issues 
were being dealt with in other international fora (including FSB, BIS and the G-20) 
and noted that  
 
“as a result of the crisis, many countries now preferred to re-regulate their financial 
systems, although their GATS commitments could prevent this. Members therefore 
faced different opinions by different international organizations as to the relationship of 
specific policies with the GATS framework of rules. This should at least be addressed 
by the Committee so as to clarify the coherence between those policy prescriptions 
and the GATS.”
81
 
 
The discussion followed a proposal by Ecuador for issues of macroprudential 
regulation to be discussed by the WTO and whether other international bodies (such 
as FSB, BIS, or IMF) should be invited to take part in those discussions. Despite the 
obvious links between the work of the WTO and other bodies working on financial 
regulation such as the FSB, there seems to be little cooperation between these 
bodies so far. This can possibly be explained by the fact that these two bodies, while 
dealing with similar issues, approach them from different perspectives, and with 
different overarching aims. The WTO’s interest in trade in financial services stems 
from the desire to promote trade liberalization whereas the FSB deals with issues of 
macroprudential regulation and seeks to promote ‘stability’ of the global financial 
system.82 
 
While the precise relationship between the FSB and the older economic institutions is 
still unfolding, the latter institutions have developed forms of cooperation and 
consultation between themselves. Although the work and goals of the IMF/World 
Bank and WTO are in many ways complementary, the relationship between them is a 
complex story.83 Even before the creation of the WTO, there were questions about 
how it would fit within the existing economic governance system. The negotiators at 
the Uruguay Round discussed ways “to increase the contribution of the GATT to 
achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making through strengthening 
its relationship with other international organizations responsible for monetary and 
financial matters.”84 One of the IMF’s key roles is to provide balance of payments 
support that further facilitates global trade. As stated above, the IMF Articles of 
Agreement also state that the Fund should cooperate with other international 
organizations in related fields. Article III(5) of the WTO Agreement sets out as one of 
the WTO’s functions the achievement of “greater coherence in global economic 
policy-making”. To this end, it states that the WTO “shall cooperate, as appropriate, 
with the International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.”85 The ‘Declaration on 
the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in 
Global Economic Policymaking’ recognizes that “interlinkages between the different 
aspects of economic policy require that the international institutions with 
responsibilities in each of these areas follow consistent and mutually supportive 
policies.”86 Ministers invited the WTO Director-General, Managing Director of the IMF 
and the President of the World Bank to review the WTO’s cooperation with the 
Bretton Woods institutions in order to achieve ‘coherence in global economic 
policymaking.’87 
 
Cooperation agreements were concluded between the WTO and the IMF/World Bank 
in 1996.88 The agreements grant mutual observer status to the secretariats and seek 
to enhance cooperation through the exchange of documents and attendance at each 
other’s meetings in areas of mutual interest. There should also be consultation in acts 
of each body that affect the field of the other, such as decisions approving restrictions 
on payments or transfers or discriminatory currency arrangements. 89  Indeed, the 
WTO-IMF relationship seems to have grown to become quite close. The consultation 
and communication between staff of the WTO Secretariat and staff at the IMF are 
said to work especially well. Siegel however notes that the legal relationship between 
the WTO and IMF is “one-sided”. For instance, while the WTO Agreements take IMF 
issues into account90, the IMF Articles of Agreement are not similarly affected by 
WTO action. Difficulties continue to arise, for example, regarding the legal 
demarcation of responsibilities of the WTO and IMF. One example is the different 
definitions of exchange restrictions.91  
 
In any event, in practice the IMF and WTO play a mutually supportive role in their 
activities. One of the aims of the IMF is to facilitate and expand international trade, 
which coincides with the aims of the WTO. The coherence between these bodies is 
continually tested, especially in the wake of financial crises, when each seeks to 
respond to the new challenges. Their overlapping roles seem to be rather minor, and 
tend to be legal and technical in nature, rather than involving larger disputes over 
responsibilities and competences. It is also understandable that the IMF, World Bank 
and WTO fit together in such a way, since they represent the original design of the 
Bretton Woods pillars.92 Although the original idea of having these bodies structurally 
linked by making them all specialized agencies of the United Nations was never 
implemented, the charters of these bodies, as well as agreements developed 
between them, have allowed them to find ways to share information and cooperate on 
a range of issues. 
 
Of all the organizations discussed here, the relationship between the IMF and World 
Bank is by far the closest. They are sometimes described as ‘sister’ institutions93, and 
there have been suggestions for the two bodies to be merged.94 Created at the same 
time, they share much in terms of institutional design, but are each given unique and 
                                                     
85
 WTO Agreement, supra note 21, Art. III(5). 
86
 Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global 
Economic Policymaking, para. 5.  
87
 Id. 
88
 Agreement between the WTO and IMF, Adopted by the IMF by Decision No. 11381-(96/105), November 25, 1996. 
89
 Agreement between the WTO and IMF , supra note 88 para. 3.  
90
 For examples of this, see Wouters and Coppens supra note 83. 
91
 The IMF has a very limited and technical definition of exchange restrictions, while the WTO looks at the effect 
measures have on trade. See Siegel, supra note 83. 
92
 M. Auboin, ‘Fulfilling the Marrakesh Mandate on Coherence: Ten Years of Cooperation between the WTO, IMF and 
World Bank’ WTO Discussion Papers No. 13 (2007), 4. 
93
 ‘Managing the Fund in a Changing World’ in J.M Boughton, Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 
1979–1989 (IMF, 2001). 
94
 See Giovanoli, supra note 70, 15; D. Carreau, ‘Why not Merge the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)’ 62(7) Fordham Law Review (1994). 
21 
 
specific mandates in economic governance. Over time, cooperation between them 
has developed even further, especially since the IMF and World Bank’s work moved 
closer towards issues such as reform in member economies, and issues such as 
poverty reduction. This has also led to an overlap in functions, which has required 
administrative arrangements to ensure coordination and coherence. This includes 
high-level coordination between the Executive Boards, as well as collaboration 
between staff. The IMF and World Bank jointly administer the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP), as discussed above, and work together on issues such 
as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), initiated by the IMF and World 
Bank in 1999. Other than these types of cooperation and consultation, there have 
been no attempts to structurally ‘merge’ the two bodies.95 This reflects the fact that, 
while having similar goals, the Fund and Bank remain separate entities, each with 
their own goals and methods of pursuing them. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to compare and critically analyse the institutional design of the 
‘four pillars’ of global economic governance: FSB, IMF, World Bank and WTO. It 
discussed how the design of these bodies is in many ways shaped by the type of 
global public good it seeks to provide. It also discussed how these four bodies have 
worked together in practice in order to develop mutually consistent and coherent 
policies. 
 
While the WTO, World Bank and IMF remain important institutions in global economic 
governance, there is a shift towards governance by informal inter-governmental 
bodies such as the FSB and G20, rather than permanent‘Bretton Woods-type’ 
institutions. The institutional design of the FSB demonstrates a deliberate choice on 
the part of G20 leaders to reject the formal institutional form of governance 
represented by the IMF and WTO for a form of ‘informal’ governance based on 
intergovernmentalism. As Giovanoli puts it, “the “horizontal” approach of 
intergovernmental co-operation (through the “Gs” and the standard-setting bodies) 
was preferred over an institutional “vertical” approach (involving an international 
organization such as the IMF to head the process).”96 States could have chosen to 
create a new formal institution responsible for financial stability  in the mould of the 
Bretton Woods institutions or to add new tasks to an existing international 
organization such as the IMF. Their actual choice represents a trend in global 
governance away from formal institutional structures towards looser networks and ‘co-
operation’. It allows states, primarily the powerful players, to maintain in control of 
developments. It establishes commitments rather than legally binding and 
enforceable rules. The FSB’s membership, although expanded to include a greater 
number of economic players, is still limited, especially when compared to the IMF, 
World Bank and WTO. However, given the important role the FSB has taken in global 
economic governance since the crisis, this informal structure no longer corresponds 
to the level of influence it now has in the global economy. The FSB’s current work 
touches upon some of the most pressing issues for the global economy, including 
ending ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ institutions,97 reform of OTC derivatives98 and identifying the 
vulnerabilities affecting the financial system that may be the cause of the next crisis. 
One could argue, however, that given the FSB’s role is one of co-ordination and 
standard-setting, it would not appropriate to burden the FSB with rigid institutional 
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structure and formal decision-making processes. This is especially the case since the 
FSB was not established to harmonize rules or to impose international regulation, but 
rather to co-ordinate other important actors involved in maintaining financial stability. 
 
Still, is the FSB’s role of coordination, standard-setting and monitoring enough to 
prevent the next crisis? First, the FSB lacks the legal ability to ‘discipline’ a members 
that does not implement its obligations. Moreover, it may be politically difficult for the 
FSB plenary to criticize FSB jurisdictions for failure to uphold their commitments, 
especially economically powerful members. As a member-driven body FSB arguably 
lacks the political independence to do so. Second, although the FSB membership 
includes the largest players in the global economy, its limited membership will 
continue to give rise to questions about its legitimacy, especially when it seeks to 
establish rules intended to have a global scope or are likely to have an impact on the 
global economy. Compared to the other pillars, the FSB remains extremely narrow in 
terms of membership. The FSB may seek to promote global compliance with financial 
standards, yet its legitimacy will likely be challenged by non-member jurisdictions as 
long as its membership remains so limited. If the FSB is to remain at the centre of 
global economic governance and financial stability, questions will arise about whether 
its design equips it to deal adequately with the many challenges it faces. Moreover, 
as it plays a greater role in economic governance, the FSB should become more 
transparent and accountable in its decision making-process. Although its website is 
bursting with Policy Frameworks, Progress Reports and other documents, there is 
precious little information about the internal workings of the FSB and its decision-
making. Ultimately, however, the FSB will be judged on its performance. This will be 
determined by whether it is able to put in place the structures and early warning 
systems to prevent or alleviate the effects of the next major crisis. The FSB’s 
predecessor, established following the Asian financial crisis, was largely unable to 
identify the vulnerabilities that led to the 2008/9 financial crisis, and the FSB’s 
creation was a response to this failure. Following the next crisis, the WTO, World 
Bank and IMF will likely remain important international institutions. Whether this will 
also apply for the FSB remains to be seen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies is an interdisciplinary research centre of the Humanities and 
Social Sciences recognized as a Centre of Excellence at the KU Leuven. It hosts researchers from law, economics, 
political science, history, philosophy and area studies. The Centre initiates and conducts interdisciplinary research 
on topics related to globalization, governance processes and multilateralism, with a particular focus on the following 
areas: (i) the European Union and global governance; (ii) human rights, democracy and rule of law; (iii) trade and 
sustainable development; (iv) peace and security; (v) global commons and outer space; (vi) federalism and multi-
level governance; (vii) non-state actors and emerging powers. It hosts the InBev Baillet-Latour Chair EU-China and 
the Leuven India Focus.  
 
In addition to its fundamental research activities the Centre carries out independent applied research and offers 
innovative policy advice and solutions to policy-makers. 
 
In full recognition of the complex issues involved, the Centre approaches global governance from a multi-level and 
multi-actor perspective. The multi-level governance perspective takes the interactions between the various levels of 
governance (international, European, national, subnational, local) into account, with a particular emphasis on the 
multifaceted interactions between the United Nations System, the World Trade Organization, the European Union 
and other regional organizations/actors in global multilateral governance. The multi-actors perspective pertains to 
the roles and interactions of various actors at different governance levels, which includes public authorities, formal 
and informal international institutions, business enterprises and non-governmental organizations. 
 
For more information, please visit the website www.globalgovernancestudies.eu   
 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
Huis De Dorlodot, Deberiotstraat 34, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel. ++32 16 32 87 25  
Fax ++32 16 37 35 47   
info@ggs.kuleuven.be  
